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Abstract 
The problem of assessing the value of a can­
didate is viewed here as a multiple combi­
nation problem. On the one hand a candi­
date can be evaluated according to different 
criteria, and on the other hand several ex­
perts are supposed to assess the value of can­
didates according to each criterion. Criteria 
are not equally important, experts are not 
equally competent or reliable. Moreover lev­
els of satisfaction of criteria, or levels of confi­
dence are only assumed to take their values in 
linearly ordered scales, whose nature is often 
qualitative. The problem is discussed within 
two frameworks, the transferable belief model 
and the qualitative possibility theory. They 
respectively offer a quantitative and a quali­
tative setting for handling the problem, pro­
viding thus a way to compare the nature of 
the underlying assumptions. 
1 Introduction 
The problem of assessing the value of a candidate (it 
may be a person, an object, or any abstract entity for 
instance) is often encountered in practice. It is usu­
ally a preliminary step before making a choice. Such a 
problem can be handled in different manners depend­
ing on what the evaluation is based. One may have ex­
pert generic rules which aim at classifying candidates 
in different categories (e.g., 'excellent','good', . . .  ,'very 
bad'). One may have a base of cases made of previ­
ous evaluations from which a similarity-based evalu­
ation of the new candidate can be performed. This 
corresponds to two popular approaches in Artificial 
Intelligence (namely, expert systems and case-based 
reasoning), that one might also like to combine. In 
the following, the value assessment problem is rather 
posed in terms of multiple criteria, whose value for a 
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given candidate can be more or less precisely assessed 
with some level of confidence by various experts (whose 
opinions are also to be fused). An important issue in 
such a problem is that the assessement of the value of 
a criteria for a candidate by an expert and their rel­
evance for the selection itself are often pervaded with 
uncertainty and imprecision. Numerical and symbolic 
analysis of the data can be considered. In this pa­
per, we show how the transferable belief model (TBM, 
[Smets, 1998]) and the qualitative possibility theory 
(QPT) can be applied to the selection problem, thus 
illustrating a numerical and a symbolic approach. Be­
sides showing how the methods can be applied, their 
comparison indicates what are the underlying assump­
tions, what can help the potential user in selecting a 
method. 
The paper is organized in four main parts. The prob­
lem is first precisely stated and the questions that it 
raises are pointed out. Then the two proposed ap­
proaches are presented and illustrated on the same ex­
ample. Lastly, a comparative discussion of the two 
approaches takes place. 
2 The multiple expert multiple 
criteria assessment problem 
The value of a candidate for a given position has to be 
assessed by a decision maker (DM). For this evalua­
tion, m criteria are used. For each criterion, the value 
of the candidate is assessed (may be imprecisely) by 
n experts (or sources). Criteria can be rank-ordered 
according to their importance for the open position. 
Their relation to the global " goodness" score of the 
candidate for the position may be also available. Each 
expert provides a precise or imprecise evaluation for 
each criterion and a level of confidence is attached to 
each evaluation by the expert who is responsible of it. 
The general reliability of each expert is also qualita­
tively assessed by DM. 
Some general comments about the problem which is 
so far informally stated, have to be made. With a 
set of candidates, one may want to i) choose the best 
one(s); ii) rank all candidates from best to worst; iii) 
give a partial order between them, with possibly some 
incomparabilities; iv) cluster the candidates in several 
groups (e.g., good ones, bad ones, those with a weak 
point w.r.t. one criterion etc.). In fact, many methods 
in decision analysis proceed by a pairwise comparison 
of candidates which supposes to know all of them from 
the beginning. In this paper, we looks for a global eval­
uation of a candidate which may be unique. In case 
the problem would be to rank-order candidates only, 
a lexicographic approach (based on the comparaison 
of vectors made of scores of each candidate w.r.t. all 
criteria ordered according to their importance) might 
be enough. However such an approach assumes that a 
complete order exists between scores (which is not in 
agreement with the fact that the scores may be impre­
cise and pervaded with uncertainty). 
The overall assumption of the model underlying the 
example is that there exist true scores for each indi­
vidual criteria and for a global goodness score, all at­
tached to the candidate, the last being a function of 
the first ones. The problem is that these true values 
are unknown to the DM and must be estimated from 
the expert opinions. 
We now introduce some notations. The candidate is 
denoted K, when necessary. Criteria are numbered by 
i: i == 1, . . .  , m. The true (unknown) value of the level 
of satisfaction of criterion i for the candidate K is de­
noted c;(K), with c;(K) E L., where L, is the ordinal 
scale of levels of satisfaction, e.g. L, = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
with 1=very bad, . . .  , 5=very good. An element of L, 
is denoted s. 
The evaluation of each criterion for K and a given 
expert j may be imprecise (either due to the fact that 
it is unclear to what precise extent K satisfies criterion 
i or due to the possible lack of competence in i of the 
expert j assessing the value). Each evaluation will be 
represented by a possibility distribution (discounted 
in case of limited expertise) restricting the more or 
less possible values of this evaluation. Let �.(K) ( 1rf 
for short) the possibility distribution restricting the 
possible values of c;(K) according to expert j. 
Experts are numbered by j: j = 1, ... , n. The function 
� is a mapping from L, to Ln:. In the example we shall 
use Ln: = {0, a, b, n} which is an ordinal scale, where 
0 corresponds to impossibility, and n to total possibil­
ity. The true (unknown) global score of K is denoted 
c( K) E L,. The associated possibility distribution is 
1l"c(K)• or simply 1!". It represents the final result of the 
assessment procedure. Again 1r : L, >-+ Ln:. The confi­
dence level of expert j in his assessment when judging 
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criterion i is denoted 'Yii, and these levels are defined 
on an ordinal scale L-y which can be related to L" as we 
shall see. The confidence of the decision maker into ex­
pert j's opinions are denoted a i, j = 1, . .. , n, and the 
aj 's are defined on an ordinal scale La. For instance, 
La = {0, r, s, n} with 0 = not confident at all, r = not 
very confident, .. . , n = very confident. The levels of 
importance of criteria are denoted {3;, i = 1, ... , m , 
and the {3; 's also belong to an ordinal scale L13. For 
instance L13 = {0, e, J, g, n} with 0 = not important at 
all, e = not very important, . . .  , n = very important. 
In the following, V and 1\ denote max and min on a 
given ordinal scale. -,x for any x in a given ordinal 
scale L = {0, s1, . . .  , Sk, n} denotes the value corre­
sponding to the reversed scale (i.e. ..,0 = n, -,s; = 
Bk-i+I ) . It is the counterpart to 1 - x on the [0, 1] 
interval scale. For simplifying the notations we have 
denoted the top and bottom elements of each scale by 
the same symbols; this does not mean that there are 
the same however. 
3 Data of the example 
For illustrative purpose we use the following exam­
ple with m = 6 criteria and n = 4 experts. Imagine 
that in some company, a new collaborator K has to be 
hired for the marketing department. Six criteria are 
used for assessing his qualifications: analysis capaci­
ties (Ana), learning capacities (Lear), past experience 
(Exp), communication skills (Com), decision-making 
capacities (Dec) and creativity (Crea). The four ex­
perts are the directors of Marketing (Mkt), Financial 
(Fin), Production (Prod), and Human Resources (HR) 
departments. The data are summarized in Table 1. 
On one side this example is intentionaly complex as 
we want to illustrate the power and flexibility of the 
two approaches. On the other side, the way the criteria 
should be aggregated is unspecified. In real life, all the 
subtleties introduced here are not necessarily present 
at the same time, which may make simpler. 
4 The TBM approach 
To represent belief functions, we use the next conven­
tion: bel� [P EV](wo E A) denotes the strength of the 
weighted opinion (called belief) held by the agent Y 
about the fact that the actual world wo belongs to A, 
a subset of the frame of discernment n, given the piece 
of evidence P EV. The same indexing is used for basic 
belief assignments and plausibility functions induced 
by bel, with the symbol bel replaced by m or pl. 
Many beliefs are used in this example. They are anal­
ogous to subjective probabilities, except they do not 
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C;; Mkt D Fin D Prod D HR D 
Ana 4 2 
Lear [2,3) [1,5) 4 [2,4) 
Exp 4 
Com 4 4 
Dec [1,5) [1 ,5) [1,2) 3 
Crea 5 1 
"'/ij Mkt D Fin D Prod D HR D 
Ana 0 n n 0 
Lear b a b n 
Exp n 0 0 0 
Com n 0 0 n 
Dec a a a a 
Crea n 0 0 n 








Table 1: Assessment by each director on each criteria 
of candidate K using L, = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (above). Self­
confidence of directors w.r.t. criteria (below). 
satisfy the additivity rule of probability theory. Their 
operational meaning and their assessment are obtained 
by methods similar to those used by the Bayesians 
[Smets and Kennes, 1994). 
In this section, we consider only candidate K and all 
beliefs are held by one DM, so we can avoid mentioning 
them. Let c; be the actual (but unknown) value of the 
level of satisfaction of criterion i. Let C;j denote the 
data collected from director j on criteria i (for K), C;j 
being the intervals given in Table 1. Missing data are 
equated to the whole interval [1, 5). 
Let II( C;j = [a, aJic; = x) be the degree of possibility 
that Director j states C;j = [a, a] with a E {1, ... , 5} 
given c; = x with x E {1, ... , 5}. It represents the 
link between what the director will say and the actual 
value c;. For simplicity sake, we use the same possi­
bility function for every criterion and every director. 
For each criterion, we assume that the possibility is 1 
when a = c;, .5 when Ia- c;l = 1, and 0 otherwise. 
More complex possibility functions could be used, the 
proposed one being only " reasonable" . It reflects the 
idea that it is (fully) possible that the director states 
the actual value, 'quite possible' that he states a value 
at one level deviation from the actual value, and im­
possible at two level deviations (director can be wrong, 
but the error will be small). 
The degree of plausibility held by DM (before consid­
ering OM's opinions about Director j's opinions) that 
the actual value of c; is in A � L,, where L,, is the 
domain of c; (equal to L,), given what the Director j 
states about criteria i, is given by: 
plL••[C;j](c; E A)= II(c; E AIC;j) 
= maxxeAII(c; = xiC;j) 
= maxxeAII(C;jlc; = x) 
= maxxeA,aec, II([a,a)lc; = x) 
It results from the classical relations pl(A) = 
II(A), II(XIY)II(Y) = II(YIX)II(X), and II(X) 
maxxexii(x). We also assume a total a priori igno­
rance on C;j and c;, i.e., II( C;j) = 1 for all C;j and 
II(c;) = 1 for all c;. 
The DM has some weighted opinions about the reli­
ability of the assessment provided by Director j on 
criteria i, represented by the coefficients "'/ij (rescaled 
into 9ij = 0, 1, 2, 3 for "'/ij = 0, a, b, n, respectively). 
DM also has some prior opinions about the impor­
tance that he should give to Director j's opinions when 
it comes to evaluating a candidate for a position like 
the open one, opinions that were coded by O:j (rescaled 
into Sj = 1, 2, 3 for O:j = r, s, n, respectively). All these 
opinions are transformed into discounting factors that 
express how much belief DM should give to the beliefs 
induced by the data produced by Director j on criteria 
i. The discounting factors d;j are decreasing when the 
o: and "Y values increase. 
Discounting factors are meta-beliefs, i.e., beliefs over 
beliefs. They were introduced in [Shafer, 1976), and 
their formal nature explained in [Smets, 1993a). Their 
real assessment is done as for any belief. For the pur­
pose of the example, we use the values obtained from 
the relation: 
d;j = 1- .95 X (g;j/3) X (.75 + .25 X (sj- 1)/3). 
Given the coefficients d;j, DM discounts belL,, [C;j] 
into belL,, [E;j] where: 
mL,, [E;j](A) = (1- d;j) x mL,, [C;j](A) if A -:f [1, 5), 
The belief function bezL., [E;j] represents OM's beliefs 
about the actual value of c; given what Director j has 
stated and OM's opinions about j's opinions (what is 
denoted by E;j). 
Then DM combines the Directors' opinions over Cri­
terion i by applying Dempster's rule of combination 
to the discounted belief functions. The resulting be­
lief function represents OM's beliefs about the actual 
value of c;. 
The real problem for DM is not to assess the actual 
value of each criterion, but to assess if candidate K is 
'good' for the position to be filled. So we introduce 
a 'Goodness Score', that will vary from 1 to 5, 1 for 
'very bad', 5 for 'very good'. The relation between 
the Goodness Score and the value of criterion i de­
pends only on (3;, the level of importance of criterion i. 
The values of/; are tabulated in Table 2. E.g., when 
(3; = g, DM accepts as 'good' (score 5) a candidate 
for whom the criterion value is 4 or 5. smaller than 
5. In practice, these values must be assessed through 
an analysis of the compensatory relation between the 
scores. E.g., it is as 'good' to have a score 3 for a cri­
terion which importance is ll than to have a score 3 
when the importance is g and to have a score 2 when 
the importance is e. 
/;(x) 1 2 3 4 5 
e 1 3 4 5 5 
I 1 2 4 5 5 
g 1 2 3 5 5 
n 1 2 3 4 5 
Table 2: Values of goodness score /;(x) given the score 
x of criterion i (from 1 to 5) and its importance /3; 
Let /; ( x) be the value of the Goodness Score when the 
score for Criterion i is x and let /;(A)= {f;(x) : x E 
A}. Then the belief over the value of the criterion i is 
transformed into a belief beiG[C;] over the Goodness 
Score by: 
mG[C;](B) = L mL•;[&jEij](A) 
A:j;(A):B 
forB � (1,2, 3,4,5] 
This just means that the basic belief mass given to A 
is transferred to the image of A under the transforma­
tion /; that holds between the criterion value and the 
Goodness Score. 
The belief function belG[C;] represents DM's beliefs 
about the Goodness of the candidate given what DM 
collected about the criteria i. These belief functions 
are then combined on i by Dempster's rule of combi­
nation. The resulting belief function represents DM's 
beliefs over the Goodness Score of candidate K given 
the collected information. 
When it comes to decide which candidate to select, 
this last belief function is then transformed into a 
(pignistic) probability, denoted BetPG, by the pignis­
tic transformation (the nature and the justification of 
which are given in (Smets and Kennes, 1994]). This 
probability function over the actual value of the Good­
ness Score can then be used to order various candi­
dates, using the classical methods developed in prob­
ability theory for such an ordering. 
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For the example under analysis, the basic belief masses 
mG for the Goodness Score and the pignistic proba­
bilities BetPG are given in Table 3. In conclusion, 
there is a strong support that this candidate is Good. 
An expected Goodness Score can be computed, which 
value is 4.61, and it could be used to compare K with 
other candidates 
focal sets 4 5 {4,5} 
m'-' .34 .58 .08 
BetPG .38 .62 
Table 3: Focal sets of mG and their masses mG for the 
Goodness Score, and non zero values of BetPG on the 
singletons of G. 
5 The QPT approach 
The problem raises three main questions: i) the repre­
sentation of the precise or imprecise score of the can­
didate provided by each expert for each criterion, in­
cluding the expert's confidence in his assessment; ii) 
the fusion of expert opinions; iii) the multiple crite­
ria aggregation. The first step is easily handled in the 
possibilistic framework. 
The possibility distribution of the true value of each 
score on criterion i according to expert j, taking into 
account his competence, is computed in the following 
way. Interval-valued scores (including single values) 
are modelled by a possibility distribution taking the 
value ll in the interval and 0 outside. Blanks (absence 
of answers) are interpreted as a possibility distribution 
being ll everywhere (modelling " unknown"). The con­
fidence level 'Yii is taken into account by a discounting 
process, defined as ( ir denotes the original possibility 
distribution function ( 11' .d.f.)) 
7r{ (s) =if{ (s) V ""/ij, "'s E L, (1) 
Note that the certainty level 'Yij E L"' is turned into 
a possibility level ""/ij over the scores not compatible 
with if{. Thus L"' is L" reversed (usual equivalence 
between certainty of A and possibility of not A). This 
leads to Table 4. In each cell the 11' .d.f is enumerated 
on L,. 
Mkt D Fin D Prod D HR D 
Ana nnnnn 000ll0 0ll000 nnnnn 
Lear allllaa nnnnn aaalla 0llllll0 
Exp 000ll0 nnnnn nnnnn nnnnn 
Com 000ll0 nnnnn nnnnn 000n0 
Dec nnnnn nnnnn llllbbb bbllbb 
Crea 0000ll nnnnn nnnnn ll0000 
Table 4: Opinions of directors on each criterion 
As already said, the global assessment requires two 
types of combination: a multicriteria aggregation prob-
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!em, and the fusion of expert evaluations. So, depend­
ing on the way the problem is presented, we may either 
think of i)first computing the global evaluation of K 
according to each expert and then to fuse these eval­
uations into a unique one, or ii)on the contrary, first 
fuse the expert evaluations for each criterion, and then 
aggregate the "global" results pertaining to each crite­
rion. In general, the two procedures are not equivalent. 
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that expert opin­
ion fusion and multicriteria aggregation are two oper­
ations which do not convey the same intended seman­
tics. The fusion of expert opinions aims at finding out 
what are the possible values of the genuine score of K 
for a given criterion, and possibly to detect conflicts 
between experts. Hopefully, some consensus should 
be reached at least on values which are excluded as 
possible values of the score. The aggregation of mul­
tiple criteria evaluations aims at assessing the global 
worth of the candidate from his scores on the different 
criteria; then different aggregation attitudes may be 
considered, e.g., conjunctive ones where each criterion 
is viewed as a constraint to satisfy to some extent, or 
compensatory ones where trade-oft's are allowed. 
In the following, we choose to merge expert's opinions 
on each criterion first, and then to perform a mul­
ticriteria aggregation, since it might seem more nat­
ural to use the experts first to properly assess the 
score according to each criterion. Proceeding in the 
other way would assume that each expert is looking 
for a global evaluation of the candidate (may be using 
his own criteria aggregation attitude) and the decision 
maker is only there for combining and weighting ex­
pert's evaluations.Since we first merge the 1!'.d.f's, one 
of the allowable methods i s to use a weighted maxi­
mum. Indeed disjunctive combination is advisable in 
case of conflicting opinions ( Dubois and Prade, 1994], 
as it is the case here (conjunctive fusion can be applied 
only if there is no conflict). A disjunctive combination 
means that the opinion of an important expert will 
be taken into account, even if this can conflict with 
another important one. However, unreliable estimates 
should be discounted in the disjunction. The reliabil­
ity W;j attached to rr{ should be both upper bounded 
by the confidence a3 of DM in the expert j and the 
self-confidence /ij of the expert. This leads to take 
the weight Wij as the conjunctive-like combination of 
a j and /ij , Vi = 1, . . .  , 6. The weighted disjunction is 
defined as: 
11':(s) = V [w;j /1 rrf(s)], Vs E L,, (2) 
j 
As said above, W;j = Iii 0 a j where 0 is a conjunction 
operator from L-y x La to L-y. Table 5 defines 0 on 
the basis of an implicit commensurateness hypothesis 
of L-y and La. 
0 0 r 8 n 
0 0 0 0 0 
a 0 a a a 
b 0 a b b 
n 0 a b n 
Table 5: Definition of 0 
Wij Mkt D Fin D Prod D HR D 
Ana 0 a a 0 
Lear b a a b 
Exp n 0 0 0 
Com n 0 0 b 
Dec a a a a 
Crea n 0 0 b 
Table 6: Weights Wij for all criteria and directors 
Table 6 gives the weights for all criteria and experts. 
We apply formula (2) to 1!'.d.f's of Table 4, and obtain 
the 11' .d.f's of Table 5 (left). 
We notice that some distributions are no longer nor­
malized (i.e., no score is fully possible at level n). 
This is because the weights are not normalized, i.e. 
VjWij < n for some i's, which means that the DM 
cannot be fully confident in any director when assess­
ing some criteria (namely Ana, Lear and Dec). 
We should either use the unnormalized distributions 
to fully keep track of the problem, or normalize them 
in a suitable way. Here, we choose the second solution, 
and propose the following approach. We consider that 
the maximum of the distribution, denoted h, reflects 
the uncertainty level, considered to be -.h in the in­
formation. This means that the amount of conflict is 
changed into a level of uncertainty and the minimum 
level of the modified distributions will be -.h. Then, 
we make an additional hypothesis that the scale is a in­
terval scale (which is questionable!) so that the profile 
of the distribution is not changed. Specifically: 
(3) 
It means that + in (3) is defined by s; + Bj = 
Bmin(k+l,i+j) on a scale {so= 0, S!, ... , Sk, Sk+l = n}. 
The result is shown in Table 5. A slightly different 
method would be to keep possibility degrees equal to 
0 at 0, since 11'1( s) = 0 means that all experts agree on 
the fact that the value s is impossible 
Ana 0a0a0 Ana bnbnb 
Lear abbba Lear bnnnb 
Exp 000n0 Exp 000n0 
Com 000n0 Com 000n0 
Dec aaaaa Dec nnnnn 
Crea b000n Crea b000n 
Table 7: Merged opinions of directors on criteria (left); 
Merged opinions after normalization (right) 
The way of aggregating the criteria evaluations is not 
at all specified in the statement of the problem. Only 
qualitative levels of importance {3; are provided for 
each criterion i. Even with ordinal scales, different 
attitudes can be thought of. The aggregation may 
be purely conjunctive (based on "min" operation), 
or somewhat compensatory (using a median opera­
tion for instance). It might be also disjunctive: at 
least one important criteron is to be satisfied, it is 
modelled by a weighted maximum. More general ag­
gregation attitudes can be captured by Sugeno's in­
tegral ([Sugeno, 1977];[Grabisch et al., 1995]). Let us 
assume that the DM has a conjunctive attitude. 
We use the weighted minimum method in what follows 
for the aggregation. With our notations, in the case of 
precise scores, the global score is obtained by 
6 
c = /\ [(..,/3;)Vc;] (4) 
i=l 
where V is a disjunctive operator from Ll' x L, to L,. 
Table 8 gives the definition of this operator. 
v 0 e f g n 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 2 2 3 4 5 
3 3 3 3 4 5 
4 4 4 4 4 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
Table 8: Definition of V 
The "fuzzy" evaluation provided by the 11' .d.f. 's can be 
handled in different ways. A natural manner to pro­
ceed is to extend multicriteria aggregation techniques 
to such non-scalar eva! nations (this can be done both 
if this step is done before or after the fusion step). At 
the technical level, this will be done using an extension 
principle [Zadeh, 1975] which enables to extend any 
function/operation f to any fuzzy arguments. Namely, 
j(P1, ... , Pm)(s) = V,=J(•'· . .  ,,m)PI(s1)11 ... 1\Pm(sm) 
where P;(s;) is the possibility degree of score si accord­
ing to 11'.d.f. P;. Here the result will be a possibility 
distribution 11' K restricting the possible values of the 
global evaluation of K. Then a fuzzy ranking method 
should be used for assessing to what extent it is cer­
tain, and to what extent it is possible that K 1 is better 
than K2, on the basis of 11'K1 and 11'K, in case of several 
candidates ([Dubois and Prade, 1983]). 
Since scores of criteria are imprecise, the extension 
principle has to be used. We have for any s E L, 
11'(s) = (5) 
Applying this formula to our data, we finally obtain 
the distribution given in Table 9. The result can be 
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score 1 
possibility degree b 
2 3 4 5 
n n n o 
Table 9: Possibility distribution 11' of the final score 
interpreted by saying that the candidate K is certainly 
not a very good candidate, but K is most likely be­
tween bad and good. Let us briefly comment the re­
sult. The most important criteria are Com and Crea, 
where the best scores are respectively 4 and 5 with 
possibility n. This explains why the global value 5 is 
impossible, since it is not reached by one important 
criterion. Besides, there is a conflict on Crea since 
score 1 has possibility degree b, which would lead to 
a global score equal to 1. Now observe that the score 
on criterion Dec which is rather important, is com­
pletely unknown, and may take any value between 1 
and 5. This explains why intermediate values2, 3 are 
also possible for the global score in a minimum- based 
aggregation. 
Note that if weighted min combinations are used both 
in the expert opinion fusion and in the multi-criteria 
aggregation then the two combinations commute. 
6 General discussion 
The reader may be astonished by the discrepancy be­
tween the results obtained by the belief function ap­
proach and by the possibilistic approach. This does 
not reflect any disagreement between the two ap­
proaches, but in fact two different options in the ag­
gregation mode of the criteria. Indeed, the TBM ap­
proach has used a compensatory aggregation mode, 
while weighted minimum has been used in the QPT 
approach (although it would be possible to use median 
operators in the qualitative setting in order to allow 
for compensation). The min-based combination is the 
only conjunctive idempotent attitude, whereas Demp­
ster's rule of combination is not idempotent (even 
though there exist other combination rules that are 
more 'cautious' and idempotent). 
Moreover, when introducing the Goodness Score in the 
belief function approach, the underlying idea is that we 
are all the less demanding for reaching the maximum 
level of satisfaction as the criterion is less important. 
This is not at all the understanding chosen in the pos­
sibilistic approach (remember that the problem is not 
completely specified). Rather, the unimportant crite­
ria were considered as somewhat satisfied even if they 
were not at all satisfied. 
In fact there are different possible ways of understand­
ing the weighting of the criteria, in a qualitative con­
junctive setting. Let c; (K) be the supposedly precise 
value of score of K, according to criterion i. Indeed, 
we can i) modify c;(K) into -,j3;Vc;(K) as we did, or 
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{ 5 if c;(K) 2:: ;3; 
ii) modify c;(K) into c;(K) if c;(K) < ;3; (;3; is 
interpreted as a threshold level to reach to be fully 
satisfied, taking advantage of the commensurateness 
hypothesis underlying Table 8). Choosing the option 
(ii) above in the QPT approach instead of (i) would 
be similar to the idea of Goodness Score as defined in 
the TBM approach. 
Another difference is that the possibility distribution 
we have obtained represents the uncertainty pervading 
the genuine value of the candidate. It is not a scalar 
expectation, a thing which can be also computed in 
the possibilistic framework as explained now. 
The assessment problem can be viewed as a decision 
to be made under uncertainty. Namely, the relevance 
of the criteria defines a candidate profile, i.e., a kind 
of utility function, while the value of the candidate K 
is ill-known with respect to each criterion (once expert 
opinions have been fused). Viewing the problem in this 
way, it is natural to compute to what extent it is cer­
tain (or it is possible) that the candidate K (whose 
level assessment may be pervaded with imprecision 
and uncertainty for each criteria) satisfies the criteria 
at the required level; see ([Dubois and Prade, 1995)) 
for an axiomatic view of the corresponding qualitative 
decision procedure. It corresponds to a fuzzy pattern 
matching problem ([Dubois et al., 1988]) in practice. 
For each criterion i, we build a satisfaction profile Jli, 
e.g., Jl;(s) = -.;3; V s. Jli means that the greater the 
score, the better the candidate, and that the satisfac­
tion degree is lower bounded by -.;3; which is all the 
greater as i is less important. Then the certainty that 
K satisfies the profile is given by 
/\; 1\6 (Jl;(s) V ..,11'c,(K)(s)) (6) 
where 11'c;K is supposed to be normalized. The possi­
bility that K satisfies the profile is 
/\; V, (Jl;(s) 1\ 11'c;(K)(s)) (7) 
where 11'c,(K) has been obtained by fusing the expert 
opinions first, at the level of each criterion. The possi­
bility degree (very optimistic) should be only used for 
breaking ties in case of equality of the certainty de­
grees for different candidates. The aggregation by /\; 
of the elementary certainty and possibility degrees can 
be justified in the possibility framework (definition of 
a join possibility distribution of non-interactive vari­
ables ([Zadeh, 1975]), and interpretation of the global 
requirement in terms of a weighted conjunction of el­
ementary requirements pertaining to each criterion). 
The expression (6) and (7) can be viewed as possi­
bilistic "lower and upper expectations" . 
What is computed remains in the spirit of the ap­
proach detailed before. Instead of obtaining a pos-
sibility distribution we obtain two scalar evaluations 
for which it should be possible to show that they sum­
marize this possibility distribution (in a sense to be 
made precise at the theoretical level). Anyway both 
approaches first compute the 11'c;(K)'s and are based on 
the choice of a weighted conjunction. 
Lastly, it is also important to judge the (potential) 
explanation capabilities. Are the results provided 
by the system easy to explain to the user if neces­
sary? E.g., why the value of the candidate is fi­
nally assessed as such? Such explanation capabili­
ties are presented in [Farreny and Prade, 1992] and in 
[Xu and Smets,1996] for what concerns the QPT and 
the TBM, respectively. 
For summarizing the main differences between the 
belief function (TBM) and the possibility-based ap­
proaches (QPT) on the value assessment problem, it 
is clear that the possibilistic method can handle poor 
data expressed in a qualitative, non-numerical, way 
whereas the belief function framework may more eas­
ily capture reinforcements and compensatory effects. 
7 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have taken advantage of a generic 
value assessment problem for discussing the different 
facets of the problem and raising the various difficulties 
and hypotheses which should be made at each step 
for computing a meaningful evaluation through two 
models, the QPT and the TBM. 
The purpose of the paper was twofold: first identi­
fying and discussing various facets of a value assess­
ment problem, and second showing how two differ­
ent approaches (which have in common the capability 
of modelling imprecision) can handle the problem in 
manners which are in fact quite parallel. 
The statement of the problem contains no number, 
but only ordinal assessments. Owing to the qualitative 
framework of possibility theory , the QPT provides an 
obvious solution. However note that it is important to 
consider the nature of the scales which are used in or­
der to know what operations are meaningful on them. 
Moreover commensurateness hypotheses are necessary. 
With the TBM, numbers (the beliefs) are needed. 
They are in fact analogous to those a probability ap­
proach would ask for. The difference between the 
TBM and a probability approach is that the TBM 
accepts and uses the data just as they are, without 
introducing extraneous data. E.g., a probability ap­
proach would allocate (equal) probabilities to each of 
the individual values of the scores when the score is 
only known as a non-degenerated interval. 
Sensitivity analysis can be performed, where either the 
values of the parameters (TBM) or the aggregation op­
erators ( QPT) are slightly modified and the robustness 
of the conclusions can be assessed. Furthermore the 
DM can also determine the sensitivity of the results if 
more precise data were collected,. Given this informa­
tion, the DM could efficiently ask to a specific expert 
to provide a better estimate of the candidate score for 
a specific criterion, avoiding getting "useless" data. 
One important point in practice for this type of prob­
lem is also to be able to provide explanations to the 
user on the results. The qualitative framework of pos­
sibility theory allows for a logical reading and pro­
cessing of the evaluations. This offers a potential for 
explanation capabilities. 
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